Rav Sperling on Eating Out

I was looking for some info on eating out, as I am currently on the road and in a place with no kosher restaurants. I know the frum 'norm' is not to eat out, but I also know from conversations with rebbeim that there may be more wiggle room than this.

In my hunt, I stumbled upon this article from Nishmat's web site (quoted in-full at the end of this post). In it R' David Sperling allows one to eat salads, fruit platters and hot (or cold) drinks out - provided of course that your salad is otherwise kosher (so obviously no Cobb salad with ham chunks).

As I said, the topic of eating out also came up when I was learning in yeshiva, and various opinions were offered.

The strictest didn't allow even the leniencies permitted in the article brought here. However, the most lenient allowed for much more in times of urgency and/or second best scenarios (shaat had'chak and/or b'dieved).

This included the possibility of relying on pizza ovens as being hot enough to be self-kashering and even accepting use of Rabbeinu Tam's ruling in regards to gvinat akum so as to accept vegetarian cheese as kosher. Hence, one rosh yeshiva said that it would certainly not be treif to order an uncut vegetarian pizza with no dvar charif - provided the sauce was also kosher (or to order the pizza with no sauce).

Another kollelnik and his wife were told by the Rosh Teshiva that in high-end gourmet restaurants the pots and pans are plentiful enough and dedicated enough that one may be able to rely upon their not having been used in the past 24 hours, or possibly ever for items other than their dedicated purpose.

There was also discussion of Hobart steam cleaners (a prevalant dishwasher used in the resturant industry) and whether or not the dishes in said dishwashers were actually kashered each time the dishes were washed. (So long as the material and use of the dish would allow kashering in such a manner.)

A friend learning at Beit Midrash HaSefardi was told by a rav there that stainless steel should perhaps be re-categorized with glass as a material that doesn't ever absorb flavor. If this were to be the case, well wow.

Anyways, this may come as future posts - along with perhaps a look into a modern trend of orthoprax Jews eating sushi out in non-kosher restaurants.

In the meantime, here is Rav Sperling's article permitting salads in non-kosher restaurants in times of need.

Keeping Kosher - Eating Out

Rabbi David Sperling

Keeping Kosher � Eating Out

I have been asked to write about eating in non-kosher restaurants. Before turning to that question, it should be quite plain that if the possibility to eat in a kosher restaurant exists, one should not eat in a non-kosher establishment. Only where there is a goodneed - such as being in a place with no kosher restaurants, or having to eat at(non-religious) family outings, or for importantbusiness meetings etc. does the question arise.

Having said that, we need to examine the following questions:

1. mar'it ayin

2. bishul akum

3. non-kosher pots and pans

4. tea and coffee

5. cold foods

6. vegetarian restaurants.

Mar'it Ayin: .8

Mar'it Ayin is a rabbinic prohibition against doing things that appear to be breaking halacha. The reason for the prohibition is because someone seeing you may assume that you are doing somethings forbidden, and a person needs to satisfy religious society's expectations of them,

just as they need to satisfy G-d's expectations (Mishnah Shekalim, Chap. 3, 2). Some also explain the reason is so others will not mistakenly assume that the act is permitted - "if she is doing it, it must be o.k." We could also add that if the person is well known as an observant Jew, there is an element of chillul Hashem, desecration of G-d's Name, by doing something that looks forbidden.

The mishnah (Shabbat 146b) states that someone whose clothes have become wet (from falling in the water), is allowed to walk in them on Shabbat without fear, however when they get to their courtyard, they lay them out in the sun, not in the public eye, lest people suspect that he laundered them on Shabbat.The gemara then saysthat this mishnah is the opinion of R. Eliezer, but that R. Shimon holds that mar'it ayin is forbidden even in private, and it is thus forbidden to hang out wet clothes even away from public view. Even though the reasons for mar'it ayin do not applie when nobody can see what is being done, R. Shimon forbids it, perhaps lest one come to do the same thing in public. This is in fact the halacha (see Shulchan Aruch Orech Hiam 301:45). The Mishnah Berura (165) quotes Tosfot ( Ketubot 60a ) who irons out several apparent contradictions in the gemara, by ruling that if the Mar'it Ayin is one where one is wrongly being suspect of doing something forbidden by the Torah (like laundry on Shabbat), then it is forbidden even in private. However, if one is being suspected of breaking a rabbinic law, he may do it in total privacy. This is the way we rule today - mar'it ayin of a suspected de'orayta is forbidden even in private, whereas mar'it ayin of a suspected d'rabanan is forbidden only in public, but permitted in private.

The question then arises, can one eat totaly kosher food in a non-kosher restaurant?Rav Moshe Feinstein, zt"l, in Iggrot Moshe (Orach Hiam Vol. 2, 40) writes that because they serve unkosher food,

"even to go in there in order to eat food that is certainly kosher is forbidden because of mar'it ayin. However, if he is extremely famished, to the extent that it causes him severe discomfort, and there

is nowhere else to eat, he may go there to eat kosher food, on the condition that this is done in private, because in cases of severe discomfort or monetary loss, the rabbis did not enact their decrees (see Ketubot p.60). {How can one eat in the restaurant in private?}

There must be no-one outside the restaurant who knows him. Because concerning thos inside the restaurant {there is no need to worry, asthey} can see that he is eating only kosher food. If there are those outside who know him, he needs to inform them that he is in severe discomfort and that is why he is going in to eat kosher food. But if he is not in severe discomfort, there is no permission to eat there."

It is not clear why Rav Feinstein rules that one can only eat "in private", that is in such a way that no-one thinks he is sinning. We have already seen that both mar'it ayin in public and in private are rabbinic laws, and if so, why doesn't the rule that the rabbis did not enact their decrees in cases of severe discomfort apply even to public mar'it ayin? Perhaps it is because public mar'it ayin also involves an element of chillul Hashem, which is a Torah prohibition, and hence, discomfort is not enough to allow the act in question.

In any case, Rav Feinstein rules that there is a problem of mar'it ayin in a non-kosher restaurant, which can only be overcome in case of great need - it would seem that severe hunger is only one example, and that one could imagine other severe circumstances.

I heard from Rav Y.H. Henkin, shlitah, that even according to the opinion of Rav Feinstein, one could enter a non-kosher restaurant to use the bathroom.

A different approach is taken by Rav Ovadiah Yosef, shlitah. I have seen quoted in his name that mar'it ayin is limited to those specific situations that were decreed by Chazal, and no others, therefore

enabling one to enter a non-kosher restaurant.This is similar to his ruling (Yechave Da'at Vol. 4, 50) about erasing tape recordings of G-d's Name, where he writes that mar'it ayin does not apply for several different reasons, then adds: "And all the more so according to the opinion of the Pri Chadash

(Yoreh De'ah 87:7) who holds that we can not forbid things due to mar'it ayin based on our own assumptions, for we have only the clear ases ruled upon in the Talmud."

This question - whether after the Talmud, we can forbid things becauseof mar'it ayin or not - is argued amongst the achronim. The Pri Chadash, as we have seen, holds that we cannot institute new

stringencies based on mar'it ayin, whereas the Pri To'ar (Yoreh De'ah 87:9) holds we can. (The Pri To'ar is supported by the factthat the Rashba -a rishon - ruled that it is forbidden to cook meat in human mothers' milk, even though this is not forbidden by the Torah or found in the Talmud, because of mar'it ayin. The Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 87:4) rules like this).

It would seem then, that though there are opinions which say that there is no problem of mar'it ayin in a non-kosher restaurant, one should not be overly lenient in this question. In situations of great need,

where Rav Feinstein's ruling is unrealistic and one cannot inform those outside, or perhaps the need is great, but not on the level of discomforting hunger, then the more lenient opinion can be relied upon

to enable one to eat kosher food in a non-kosher restaurant.

Bishul Akum: (Non-Jewish Cooking) .8�

There is a rabbinic prohibition on eating certain foods cooked by non-Jews, which is called "Bishul Akum". The gemara (Avoda Zara 38a) brings two definitions of which foods are Bishul Akum, which are ruled, together, in the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah, 113:1). They are

1) cooked foods which are not eaten in their raw state

2) food which is customarily served at a king's table, to accompany the bread or as an appetizer/dessert. We rule that to be forbidden, it must both be eaten only cooked and be

served at a king's table. The reason for this rabbinic law is to decrease the chances of intermarriage through mixed dining. Unimportant food, that is, either food which can be eaten raw, or which is never to

be found on a king's table, was allowed as one is rarely invited out to eat such food.

Amongst the poskim, there exists much debate over which foods fall into the category of bishul akum. It is impossible here to give an extensive list of the opinions in regard to each food item. Suffice it to say, there are rabbis (Rav Y.E. Henkin zt"l) who define bishul akum very leniently, applying it only to extreme delicacies, and their opinion can be relied upon in times of need. However, in most cases, the types

of foods that can be eaten in non-kosher restaurants is limited in any event because of kashrut (see further) and those that are kosher are generally not in the category of bishul akum.

Let us just examine the question of tea and coffee. There are several reasons to conclude that there is no problem of bishul akum here. Firstly, one may say that they are not important enough to be considered as appropriate for a king's table (Radbaz). Some say these drinks are permitted just as beer is permitted (Yoreh De'ah 114:1). This is because even though the cooked grains in the beer are not eaten raw, and may be considered bishul akum, they are nullified in relation to the amount of water in which they are cooked and subsequently drunk. Thisconcept is further illustrated in the bracha which is recited over beer, tea and coffee - rather than being "mezonot" over the grains of barley in the beer, or "ha'adamah" on the coffee beans, "shehakol" is the bracha recited over these beverages, indicating the primary importance of the water (Tosfot).

Despite this, the Ari HaKadosh was strict and refrained from drinking coffee prepared by non-Jews, and the Chochmat Adam (66:14) also writes that anyone who has a trace of Torah in them will distance themselves from entering into a non-Jewish home to drink anything. However, the custom today is certainly to be lenient in this matter (see Rav Ovadiah Yosef, Yechave Da'at, Vol. 4, 42, who brings extensive sources to be lenient) and we hold that there is no bishul akum in tea and coffee.This nevertheless still requires a halachic examination of the dishes these beverages are cooked and served in.

3. Non-kosher Pots and Pans: 1H

The next problem the non-kosher restaurant presents is the vessels the food is cooked in. Food cooked in a non-kosher pot absorbs the taste of the non-kosher pot and causes the food to become non-kosher itself. However, this is only true if the pot has been used for non-kosher food within the last twenty-four hours. If not, even though it is rabbinically forbidden to cook in such a utensil, food which is cooked

in it, either by mistake, or by a non-Jew (without having been requested to do so by a jew), is considered perfectly kosher. Based on this rule, the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 122,6), writes that one does not have to worry about the pots and pans that a non-Jew cooked in (that perhaps they had non-kosher food absorbed into them), as there is an assumption that a vessel has not been used in the last twenty-four hours ("stam k'li aino ben yomo).

There are two reasons, however, which forbid us from making use of this law. The first is that even though we can assume that the pot has not been used in the last twenty-four hours, and does not render the food t'raif, it is forbidden in the first place, lechatchilah, to cook in it. Only after the fact, bedi'eved, if it was used by accident, can we eat the food. Not only can we not cook in it, but according to the Shulchan Aruch (Yoreh De'ah 122,6), "it is forbidden to tell a non-Jew to cook vegetables for him {the Jew} in the non-Jew's pot". This would mean that we could not order anything cooked in a t'raif restaurant, as

that would amount to telling the non-Jew to cook the food.

Secondly, even if the food was cooked without our requesting it, for instance, in a self-serve cafeteria, where the food is cooked and then sold without ordering, there is still a problem. There are many poskim who say that the assumption that a vessel has not been used for non-kosher food in the last twenty-four hours is not applicable in a place where the utensils are in constant use. Even though there are those who argue, it seems that the halacha adheres to the strict opinion (see Yechave Da'at, Vol. 4, 42, for Rav Ovadya Yosef's sources).

4. Tea and Coffee: 1

Nonetheless, perhaps there is room to allow the drinking of tea and coffee. The hot water is generally boiled in a special kettle, used only for this purpose, which would preclude any possibility of non-kosher food being absorbed into these vessels at all.

The tea-cups may present a problem, as they may have been used withnon-Jewish milk, "chalav akum". For those who are lenient and drink chalav akum in countries that have government supervision to ensure that only cows' milk is sold as standard milk, based on the opinion of Rav Feinstein, this difficulty would be eliminated. Even those who are strict may perhaps rely on that ruling when it is only a question of a doubt - "perhaps non-Jewish milk was used in the last twenty-four hours in the cup".

In a glass or duralex cup, there is also room to be lenient, based on the opinions that glass does not absorb.

It would therefore be preferable to use a disposable cup, or a glass. But if these options are unavailable, one can drink kosher tea or coffee from a regular cup (see Yechave Da'at, ibid., and also the Nodah

Bi'Yehudah, Yoreh De'ah, 36).

5. Cold Foods: 1:

This leaves us with cold, raw foods, such as a fruit platter or plain vegetable salad. Even though the knife used to cut with, as well as the plate and cutlery are not kosher, they do not cause absorption ofany traif taste into the food, because it is all cold and clean.

"Sharp" foods, such as raw onions and garlic, do draw out any absorbed taste from the knife onto the food. There is an opinion, which we follow, that this is so even if the knife was used for non-kosher hot food more than twenty-four hours ago (Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh De'ah, 96). Therefore, one should specifically order a salad with no onions � or else eat everything but the onions.

Although there are lenient opinions, such as those who say this only applies if the knife was used for hot non-kosher food within the last twenty-four hours, which perhaps we can assume did not happen (see

above, section 3), it seems to me that because it is relatively easy to order a salad without onions, one should not rely on these leniencies.

Care needs to be taken regarding the salad dressing.Commercially- produced dressings are often not kosher. Plain olive oil (as well as pure vegetable oil) and vinegar are acceptable, as long as the vinegar is not wine-vinegar, which falls under the laws of non-kosher wines which need special supervision (as do plain fruit juices which contain grape juice). Raw lemon juice, even though the lemon may be considered as "sharp" and have the same law as an onion, is permitted due to the fact that it is not so "sharp" and only draws out a small amount of non-kosher taste from the knife, which is nullified in the large amount of lemon juice. To this we can add the lenient opinions mentioned above that only the taste of the last twenty-four hours is drawn out. Plus the fact that perhaps a lemon is not considered "sharp" at all by some authorities. (See Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh Deah 96:4 and the Shach there, as well as the Chayei Adam 49:7). All other dressings - mayonnaise, thousand island, cheese etc - need to be avoided.

All this is true outside Israel. However, in the Holy Land one must also be aware of the problems of Trumah, Ma'aser, Orlah, and Shmitah.

6. Vegetarian Restaurants: 1F

Nearly everything we have discussed here applies also to vegetarian restaurants. Firstly, there are foods which could be classed as vegetarian, according to their list of ingredients, but which are

halachically t'raif.

Margarine, for example, may contain less than 2% of animal fats, which is still not kosher, but not list it as an ingredient due to its minimal percentage. If food is cooked with this, depending on the amount used, it is not kosher.

Most vegetarian restaurants also use wine in their cooking - non-Jewish wine is not kosher. They also use cheeses which, even if they are rennet-free, require kosher supervision (see Shulchan Aruch, Yoreh

De'ah 115,2). There are alsoproblems of bishul akum and checking vegetables and nuts for bugs. In Israel, the additional requirements of t'rumah, ma'aser, orlah and shmittah arise.

In short, the fact that it is a vegetarian restaurant certainly does not make it kosher, unless the local rabbi has given his kashrut certification or approval.

In Conclusion:

Based on what we have learned above, it seems that if someone is in a situation requiring them to eat in a non-kosher restaurant, then they could eat there as long as they are very selective about what they eat, limiting themselves to cold raw fruits and vegetables (without the onions etc), and plain tea and coffee (see above about what type of cup to use).

Rethinking Driving on Shabbat

Thought-driven cars aren't yet at mass market, but technology is in the works such that one day we may not be buying them. In such a case, we won't have to use the gas pedal, breaks, turn signals or even the steering wheel. German scientists have already tested a prototype in Berlin, and the DARPA and Google are also in on the game.

For the halachic system, this prompts the question of whether such cars would be permissible on shabbat.

There is no direct action causing the outcome, it is purely thought directed. And, if the car is electric, it is a d'rabannan prohibition alraedy.

There can likely be some debate about this last statement, but R' Shlomo Zalman Auerbach and others have ruled there is essentially no basis for forbidding electricity in and of itself; and beyond that, even though we claim minhag clal yisrael, there are those alive today who remember using electricity in various manners on shabbat and yom tov before Mosheh Feinstein, the Lubavitcher Rebbe and others took up a battle against electricity on Shabbat in the mid-20th century.

One of the Rabbi-PhD's on staff at Bar Ilan University claims thought-driven cars may well be permitted on shabbat. At the 18th Torah and Science Conference, Rabbi Dr. Dror Fixler acknowledges some will want to forbid driving such a vehicle on shabbat, but according to an article in the Jerusalem Post, he argues it isn't so clear that driving it on shabbat would violate halacha:

But there are those who could contend that just thinking does not constitute a “melacha” – prohibited activity on Shabbat that was necessary for the construction of the Tabernacle taken by the People of Israel through the desert after the Exodus from Egypt. There are 39 such types of “work” and their subcategories that cannot be performed on the Sabbath.

The discussion would discuss whether an bionic artificial limb that is moved with brain pulses – which is much closer to actual use than think-only cars – or a bionic eye that could enable the blind see – could be used on Shabbat.

Fixler noted that even without seeing something work such as a remote control it could be argued that the tool was under the user’s control without actually being observed as doing something; it is much more complicated if only the brain is in control, he said.

Only time will tell how the Orthodox community takes in such advances when (and if) they should reach the mass market. There would also be issues of eiruv and tchum shabbat, but we can look at tshuvot regarding bikes on shabbat for precedents there.

In the mean time, it is interesting to think of all the possible tasks that could become thought-driven, and thus possibly permitted on shabbat.

Equating Excessive Stringency to Idolatry

Reading Ynet this morning, it was refreshing to note a Chabad rabbi making an argument for the more liberal and open orthodoxy advocated by many, including this website.

Rather than reiterating his points, I'll just bring Rabbi Levy Brackman's article:

Stop making the golden calf
In mainstream Orthodox community, it seems strictest interpretations and rulings, rather than most lenient win out, damaging Jewish community as a whole
Published: 09.01.10, 08:54 / Israel Jewish Scene

Whether it’s about conversion, gender issues, or any other of a host of contentious problems facing the Jewish world it seems that within the mainstream Orthodox community the strictest interpretations and rulings, rather than the most lenient win out. This then has a damaging ripple effect for the Jewish community as a whole. To be sure there have always been a differing views with regard both practice and religious outlook. In the Talmud often these disputes are resolved by following the majority opinion where often the lenient opinion was favored.

The best example of this is the arguments between Hillel and Shammai. Hillel was known to be a tolerant, calm and humble man whose rulings were usually lenient. Shammai, conversely, was known to be less patient and more radical and strict in his opinions.

The Talmud relates that once the Students of Shammai coerced Hillel to accept a stricter decision. Here is the story: A sword was planted in the Hall of Study and it was made known that, "He who wants to enter can do so but no one can leave!" On that day Hillel sat submissive before Shammai, like one of the disciples and that day was as difficult for the Jews as the day the golden calf was made (Babylonian Talmud, Shabbat 17a).

The obvious interpretation of this Talmudic passage is that since due process was not followed and Hillel was belittled and his opinion overruled in an unfair manner it was a terrible day for the Jews. I venture to suggest an alternative interpretation. Hillel’s opinion was almost always more lenient and easier to follow. He made Judaism more compassionate and accessible to the average person. The day when Shammai was able to force his strict interpretation of Judaism upon the masses was a terrible day not just for scholars but for the entire Jewish nation.

The Talmud goes as far as to compare it to the day the golden calf was made. This is to be taken with the utmost seriousness. The Talmud is telling us that when a lenient and compassionate representation of Judaism is passed up for a stricter and less forgiving version it is as destructive to Judaism and Jewish continuity as the day the golden calf was made.

Tragically today this lesson is lost on most of the Jewish world. As Orthodox Judaism moves towards adapting stricter and stricter opinions as its mainstream it alienates more and more Jews who stop relating. This can be seen in many areas including some which are extremely contentious. The Orthodox world is being led by a pious yet uncompromising spiritual leadership.

Thus, when Jews who are outside the fold of Orthodoxy look inwards they are struck by an uncompromising system that is strict, often incomprehensible and at times uncompassionate—a Judaism that is more representative of a Shammaic attitude than that of Hillel. For those who care about the future of the Jewish people this is a tragic day—to use the Talmudic extreme, as tragic as the day the golden calf was made.

Contemporary Judaism needs to understand that stricter is often worse not better. It needs to realize that both opinions are legitimate and that the more lenient view is almost always the more appropriate and constructive one to take. Ultimately it is the lenient and compassionate approach which edifies Judaism rather than the opposite.

Problems with the Statement on Homosexuality

In the past month or so there has been much discussion of a "Statement of Principles on the Place of Jews with a Homosexual Orientation in Our Community".

I contemplated signing the document, but in the end decided not to, and instead have finally written up some of my reasons for not doing so and are posting them here.

In short - the document is trying to move the orthodox community I think it should go in, one it needs to go in. As others have said before me, the main thrust of the Statement of Principals is that all people should be treated with respect regardless of sexual orientation.

But, rather than issuing this short message, the Statement tries to flesh out some of the details, and does so in ways that I don't always agree with.

Here are my comments on the clauses in the original, and a couple of 'meta-issues' below follow after the clauses:

Clause 3: I question whether "Halakhah sees heterosexual marriage as the ideal model and sole legitimate outlet for human sexual expression" as is claimed in this clause of the Statement. What about pelegeshim/concubines and premarital relations (a debate for another post - but Ramban was matir while Rambam who was not)? While they may not be ideal, they might be legitimate.

I am also curious about Halakhah's sexual ethics for non-Jews. While I know the Statement addresses those 'in our community' - AKA Jews - the statement has been and will be read by some as being Judaism's view on the world, not Judaism's view on Jews. While the sheva mitzvot clearly encourage marriage, do they require it? And in light of a prior post on the meaning of Toeva, perhaps homosexuality is allowed for non-Jews. I certainly don't recall seeing it forbidden in any interpretations/compendiums I have read of the noahide laws.

Clause 4: What is the meaning of "Halakhic Judaism views all male and female same-sex sexual interactions as prohibited"? What is a sexual interaction? Can I hug fellow men? Only if I'm not gay, perhaps only if they also aren't? Where do we draw the line? And, I recall having learnt of more liberal stances on lesbianism. Rabbi Chaim Rapaport has even pondered whether lesbian couples need to keep hilchot niddah with each other.

Clause 5: "Whatever the origin or cause of homosexual orientation, many individuals believe that for most people this orientation cannot be changed. Others believe that for most people it is a matter of free will. Similarly, while some mental health professionals and rabbis in the community strongly believe in the efficacy of “change therapies”, most of the mental health community, many rabbis, and most people with a homosexual orientation feel that some of these therapies are either ineffective or potentially damaging psychologically for many patients." Here I must ask - why give this much credit to change therapy? If it doesn't work, state that, and don't give it undue credit. I've known a few people who have undergone change therapy, some have even gotten married to a partner of the opposite sex afterwards. I haven't followed the lives of everyone I have met who underwent change therapy, but know it did not work for some (including some who really wanted it to work for them as they saw it as a theological need). But every single one of the marriages I know of has ended with the formerly homosexual partner realizing they are still homosexual.

Clause 11: This clause talks about how "Halakhic Judaism cannot give its blessing and imprimatur to Jewish religious same-sex commitment ceremonies and weddings" but must accept the families that spring from such relationships. I've seen a few blogs claim the later part of this clause, the acceptance, is a back door trying to force the orthodox world to accept same-sex commitment ceremonies and weddings. It may be. But my problem is actually that it shouldn't be a back door acceptance. While a halachic wedding (kiddushin) can not be enacted when the partners don't fit certain criteria, that doesn't preclude the Jewish establishments provision for an alternate ceremony. One with no 'halachic' meaning. After all, even if just from a pikuach nefesh perspective, wouldn't halakha prefer a monogamous homosexual partnership to a forbidden gay/lesbian promiscuous single life? And, committing to live together doesn't need to mean committing to do forbidden acts together. There could even be a 'frum' commitment ceremony where a couple commits to care for each other, to love each other, and to work to contain the physical expressions of their desires to only those which they (and their rabbi?) find halachically acceptable.

Clause 12: Here the Statement says that "under most circumstances" homosexual Jews should not be encouraged to marry people of the opposite gender. What troubles me is the implication that in some cases they should be encouraged to. So what cases would this be? Further, might there be halachic questions as to whether or not they even can marry?

Meta-Issues:

Transgendered Individuals: OK - so this statement addresses the LG part of the LGBT community, and in ignoring bisexuals tells them to suppress/ignore their non-heterosexual desires. But it provides no framework whatsoever for dealing with transgendered individuals. Again, the statement overall is a step towards inclusion. But, I would like a statement that is even more inclusive, one that includes gender identity. This is a topic with much debate - in the mid-late 90's as Dana International represented Israel at Eurovision a number of poskim discussed the issue, and with an array of opinions. Is it too much to ask for a statement calling on the acceptance of all members of the Jewish community regardless of sexual orientation, gender identity or the likes? Their ritual roles may not be equal (hey - gender differentiation is one of the defining hallmarks of orthodoxy in the liberal 21st century world), but the individuals should be welcomed in.

Role of a Statement: Does having a statement in and of it self further the cause of creating open communities, or does it hinder the cause? The statement is irrelevant to most of the open-orthodox/liberal end of the halachic spectrum, and it will likely be ignored (or chastised) by much of the more right/conservative end of that very spectrum. So, does it bring attention in a positive or negative manner. I don't know the answer, but am intrigued by the question.

Shabbat Nose Picking

So, can you pick your nose on Shabbat?

I have to admit, the question had never really occurred to me.

When I was a teenager in Yeshiva, we'd asked one of our rabbis about popping zits on Shabbat, but not nose-picking.

However, somehow, it came up this past Shabbat. One at the table quoted in the name R' Ovadia Yosef, saying that it was borer (sorting) to pick your nose, and thus forbidden on Shabbat. This makes sense - borer means sorting, and taking away things you don't want from things you want (like taking your unwanted bugger our of your nose) could indeed be construed as borer. Though I would think that for the same reasons we are allowed to wipe ourselves clean after going to the bathroom, we may be allowed to get that snot out of our nose.

So, with a little (post-Shabbat) research, a new reason was arrived at: a few web sites quote Ovadia Yosef as having said in a 1998 shiur that you might inadvertently pull out your nose-hairs in picking your nose on Shabbat. And, as we aren't allowed to trim our hair or nails on Shabbat, this would indeed be a no-no.

However, an AP article (yes, this made it into the news) from shortly after the class says that while R' Yosef did indeed dig into whether or not the risk of hair trimming might forbid nose picking on Shabbat, the conclusion of Rabbi Ovadia Yosef's ruling was apparently that nose picking was indeed permitted on Shabbat. While I have not seen the video of this webcast, he apparently didn't relate to borer/sorting at all, and he ruled that as the hair trimming was inadvertent and not an automatic part of the nose-picking process, nose picking could go on.

So - to answer the question raised at the Shabbat table - doe forbidding Shabbat nose picking mean it would be permissible during the week? Well, obviously yes as it is allowed on Shabbat too according to R' Yosef.

In case you are curious, here is the text of the 11 January 1998 AP article on our topic:

JERUSALEM (AP) -- A leading ultra-Orthodox rabbi in Israel has ruled that it is permitted to pick your nose on the Jewish Sabbath, his aide said Sunday.

Rabbi Ovadia Yosef delivered the ruling Saturday night in a sermon relayed by satellite to his followers in Israel and abroad.

The Israeli newspaper Yediot Ahronot had reported that Yosef had said nose-picking is forbidden because tiny hairs inside the nostrils might also be pulled out. But a viewing of a videotape of the event confirmed that Yosef had in fact ruled it was permitted.

Yosef is among a select group of rabbis who respond to questions from Jews -- serious or otherwise -- on the minutiae of applying Jewish law to daily life.

The Iraqi-born Yosef, a former chief rabbi in Egypt and Israel and a leading authority on Jewish law, is spiritual leader of the religious political party Shas, which has 10 seats in Israel's Parliament.

So - pick away, but please - show some discretion. Even if it is permitted by R' Ovadia Yosef, that doesn't mean anyone else wants to watch you go at it! Perhaps you could get a tissue and excuse yourself to another room first?

Toeva and Homosexuality

A friend and I were recently discussing the term used in the Torah to discuss homosexual relations - toevah, normally translated as abomination. It is worth noting most/all other biblical uses of this word describe things that other cultures do and the culture under discussion (usually the Israelites) shouldn't do, so as not to be like the other culture.

You can read more about that over at Religion Dispatches.

The friend wanted to know what the traditional Jewish view on this word (and thus on homosexuality) was. They also wanted to know what preceded this word.

This post stems from that question...

The term abomination only came around with translation, the Hebrew is toevah, and hard to know what (if anything) predated this term as it appears in Leviticus/Vayikra.

It may be worth noting that in Jewish eyes the transgressions of Sodom are primarily, inhospitality to guests & unethical trading. With physical lust - including the attempted homosexual rape of Lot's guests - a secondary issue. And it may be worth stressing that was not just a homosexual incident, but rather attempted rape - something that would be bad regardless of the genders/sexualities involved.

In the 5th century the Talmud (Nedarim 51A) recorded that the sage Bar Kappara explained the word toeva in relationship to homosexuality as meaning "toeh ata ba" - "you go astray because of it". The traditional Jewish commentators (Rashi, Tosofot & Ran) on the Talmud all explain that Bar Kappara means men would be off having sex with other men if it were allowed, leaving their wives lonely/unsatisfied and potentially leading the wifes to then seek out other men to fulfill their needs. IE - homosexual sex undermines the (presumed) family unit. (Yes, rabbinic Judaism most definitely presumes that its adherents have heterosexual relationships, and also from this text we can perhaps infer that it also presumes men would all abandon their marriages and flock to homosexual relationships if there were permitted to do so, though that may be taking things a bit too far.)

It may also be interesting to note the statement of Rabbi Judah in the 3rd century work the mishna (Kiddushin 82a): "two bachelors should not sleep under one cover." From the continuing conversation there, he clearly thinks bachelors will succumb to the temptations homosexuality, and he clearly thinks that is a thing to be avoided. (Also worth noting that the other sages reject his notion and say bachelors can share a bed.)

As for modern Jewish law, Rabbi Yuval Sherlow (head of Yeshivat Petach Tikvah), Rabbi Steven Greenberg (first openly gay orthodox rabbi) and the film Trembling Before God, all present fairly open/understanding viewpoints. But their voices are the minority (even if a growing one). More 'mainstream' Jewish legal camps say while it may be OK to be a homosexual, the fulfillment of homosexual desires is forbidden.

Also worth noting that Jewish laws approach to lesbianism is generally more open than how it deals with male homosexuality. The talmud is very open, though around 900 years ago Maimonides ruled that lesbianism is forbidden.

There is also a growing body of work on how Jewish law deals with transgendered people, and whether or not Judaism recognizes a 'spiritual' gender switch as being possible - and if so at what point/under what conditions.

And of course I should note that while Judaism presumes most people to be either male or female, there is also recognition of 3 other gender categories: Androgynous (born with both male and female gender markers), 'Tumtum' (those born with no gender markers) and Eunuch (born males, but who have had their masculinity removed).

Back to Life

We're looking to get the website up and running again!

Sorry for the extended break. We should start posting once a week on Fridays as of the first Friday in September (2009).

As previously stated, many of the initial explorations will be into food related issues. Exploring issues of adoption, homosexuality, non-jewish interactions, funerary customs and other modern topics may also come up...